Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (scotus)

In Harrow v. Department of Defense, Stuart Harrow appealed an adverse administrative decision after the 60-day deadline -- claiming that he was unaware of the deadline.  He filed this appeal to the Federal Circuit.  Because the Federal Circuit saw the mandatory "shall" language in the statute (that is, it shall be filed within 60 days), the Court denied his request, reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction.  The issue in front of the Supreme Court was whether this provision was jurisdictional.  Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, decided that the provision was mandatory, but not jurisdictional, and the lower court therefore, could exercise its discretion to hear the case.  Vacated and remanded. 

Smith v. Spizzirri The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sets forth procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Section 3 of the FAA, entitled “Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration,” provides that when a dispute is subject to arbitration, the court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” 9 U. S. C. §3. In this case, petitioners filed suit against respondents in state court alleging violations of federal and state employment laws. Respondents then removed to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. Petitioners agreed their claims were arbitrable, but contended that §3 of the FAA required the District Court to stay the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it entirely. The District Court issued an order compellin

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU ET AL. v. COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LTD., ET AL. The Constitution gives Congress control over the public fisc subject to the command that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Art. I, §9, cl. 7. For most federal agencies, Congress provides funding through annual appropriations. For the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, however, Congress provided a standing source of funding outside the ordinary annual appropriations process. Specifically, Congress authorized the Bureau to draw from the Federal Reserve System an amount that its Director deems “reasonably necessary to carry out” the Bureau’s duties, subject only to an inflation-adjusted cap. 12 U. S. C. §§5497(a)(1), (2). In this case, several trade associations representing payday lenders and credit-access businesses challenged regulations issued by the Bureau pertaining to high-interest consumer loans on statutory and constitutional g

Culley v. MarshallPetitioner Halima Culley loaned her car to her son, who was later pulled over by Alabama police officers and arrested for possession of marijuana. Petitioner Lena Sutton loaned her car to a friend, who was stopped by Alabama police and arrested for trafficking methamphetamine. In both cases, petitioners’ cars were seized under an Alabama civil forfeiture law that permitted seizure of a car “incident to an arrest” so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture case. Ala. Code §20–2–93(b)(1), (c). The State of Alabama filed forfeiture complaints against Culley’s and Sutton’s cars just 10 and 13 days, respectively, after their seizure. While their forfeiture proceedings were pending, Culley and Sutton each filed purported class-action complaints in federal court seeking money damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983, claiming that state officials violated their due process rights by retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without holding preliminary hearings. In a consolidated ap

Warner Chappell Music v. NealyUnder the Copyright Act, a plaintiff must file suit “within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U. S. C. §507(b). On one understanding of that limitations provision, a copyright claim “accrue[s]” when “an infringing act occurs.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. 663, 670. But under an alternative view, the so-called discovery rule, a claim accrues when “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered,” the infringing act. Ibid., n. 4. That rule enables a diligent plaintiff to raise claims about even very old infringements if he discovered them within the three years prior to suit. In this case, respondent Sherman Nealy invoked the discovery rule to sue Warner Chappell Music for copyright infringements going back ten years. Nealy argued that his claims were timely because he first learned of the infringing conduct less than three years before he sued. In the District Court, Warner Chappell accepted that the discovery rule governed the time

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from one job to another because she is a woman. From 2008 through 2017, Muldrow worked as a plainclothes officer in the Department’s specialized Intelligence Division. In 2017, the new Intelligence Division commander asked to transfer Muldrow out of the unit so he could replace her with a male police officer. Against Muldrow’s wishes, the Department approved the request and reassigned Muldrow to a uniformed job elsewhere in the Department. While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same in the new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not. After the transfer, Muldrow no longer worked with high-ranking officials on the departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division, instead supervising the day-to-day activities of neighborhood patrol officers. She also lost access to an unmarked take-home vehicle and had a less regular schedule involving week

McIntosh v. United States Petitioner Louis McIntosh was indicted on multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses. The indictment set forth the demand that McIntosh “shall forfeit . . . all property . . . derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of the [Hobbs Act] offenses.” The Government also later provided McIntosh with a pretrial bill of particulars that included as property subject to forfeiture $75,000 in cash and a BMW that McIntosh purchased just five days after one of the robberies. After a jury convicted McIntosh, the District Court imposed a forfeiture of $75,000 and the BMW at the sentencing hearing. Although the District Court also ordered the Government to submit an order of forfeiture for the court’s signature within a week from the hearing, the Government failed to do so. On appeal, the Government moved for a limited remand to supplement the record with a written order of forfeiture. The Second Circuit granted the unopposed motion. Back in District Court, McIntosh argued t

 Petitioner James Rudisill enlisted in the United States Army in 2000 and served a total of eight years over three separate periods of military service. He became entitled to Montgomery Bill benefits as a result of his first period of service. Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree and used 25 months and 14 days of Montgomery benefits to finance his education. Through his subsequent periods of service, Rudisill also became entitled to more generous educational benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits to finance a graduate degree. Rudisill understood that such benefits would be limited to 22 months and 16 days under §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. But the Government informed Rudisill that he was only eligible for 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefits (the length of his unused Montgomery benefits) due to §3327, a provision in the Post-9/11 Bill designed to coordinate benefits for those servicemembers meeting the criteria for both Montgomery benefits and

DEVILLIER v. TEXAS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUITArgued Jan. 16, 2024—Decided Apr. 16, 2024 Richard DeVillier and more than 120 other petitioners own property north of U. S. Interstate Highway 10 between Houston and Beaumont, Texas. The dispute here arose after the State of Texas took action to use portions of I–10 as a flood evacuation route, installing a roughly 3- foot-tall barrier along the highway median to act as a dam. When subsequent hurricanes and storms brought heavy rainfall, the median barrier performed as intended, keeping the south side of the highway open. But it also flooded petitioners’ land to the north, causing significant damage to their property. DeVillier filed suit in Texas state court. He alleged that by building the median barrier and using his property to store stormwater, Texas had effected a taking of his property for which the State must pay just compensation. Other property owners filed similar suits. Texas removed the cases to federal cour

George Sheetz was required by the County of El Dorado to pay $23,420George Sheetz tried to get a residential building permit from El Dorado County.  To do so, the County made him pay a $23,420 "traffic impact fee."  The fee was part of the County's "General Plan" -- this plan was intended to address the impact that development has on public services. This fee was calculated based on a standard schedule, rather than any actual impact resulting from his development.  Sheetz paid the fee under protest.  He sued in state court, claiming that the fee amounted to an "exaction" that violated the Takings Clause.  Sheetz argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, require the County to make an individualized determination. The County argued that these cases only apply to individual decisions by administrators, but not by legislative bodies.  Held: The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative an

Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation owns a subsidiary that operates terminals to store bulk liquid commodities, including No. 6 fuel oil, which has almost 3% sulfer. The UN adopted IMO in 2016, which set in in 2020. This regulation capped the sulfur content on fuel oil used in shipping to 0.5%. Macquarie did not discuss this IMO in its public documents, but in February 2018, its stock fell 41% after announcing that it lost contracts in of its subsidiary. Moab partners sued for violating SEC Rule 10b-5(b) - failure to omit material facts about securities. The trial court dismissed the complaint, the Second Circuit reversed because of its duty to disclose. Held: Pure omissions are not actionable under Rule 10b–5(b). Rule 10b– 5(b) makes it unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” In addition to prohibiting “any untrue statement of

Flowers makes baked goods that are then distributed across the country.  Bissonnette owned the distribution rights in a certain part of the country.  Their contract subjected them to the F.A.A..  After Bissonnette sued under Labor (wage) laws, Flowers moved to compel arbitration.  Bissonnette said they're exempt because the F.A.A. exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”  The District Court dismissed the case, sending it to Arbitration.  The Second City affirmed, finding that the exemption only applied to workers in the transportation industry, but these were workers in the bakery industry. Held: A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under §1 of the FAA.(a) The Court has long recognized that the exemption in §1 is limited to transportation workers. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. Applying the ejusdem generis canon of statutory interpretation to

 Respondent Yonas Fikre, a U. S. citizen and Sudanese emigree, brought suit alleging that the government placed him on the No Fly List unlawfully. In his complaint, Mr. Fikre alleged that he traveled from his home in Portland, Oregon to Sudan in 2009 to pursue business opportunities there. At a visit to the U. S. embassy, two FBI agents informed Mr. Fikre that he could not return to the United States because the government had placed him on the No Fly List. The agents questioned him extensively about the Portland mosque he attended, and they offered to take steps to remove him from the No Fly List if he agreed to become an FBI informant and to report on other members of his religious community. Mr. Fikre refused. He then traveled to the United Arab Emirates, where he alleges authorities interrogated and detained him for 106 days at the behest of the FBI. Unable to fly back to the United States, he ended up in Sweden, where he remained until February 2015. While there, he filed this suit, alleging that the gov

Wilkinson v. Garland Congress gives immigration judges discretionary power to cancel the removal of a noncitizen and instead permit the noncitizen to remain in the country lawfully. 8 U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). An IJ faced with an application for cancellation of removal proceeds in two steps: The IJ must decide first whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of removal under the statutory criteria. If the IJ finds the noncitizen statutorily eligible, the IJ must then decide whether to exercise discretion and grant relief. For determining eligibility, Congress has enumerated four statutory criteria, one of which requires the noncitizen to “establis[h] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [the noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child,” who is a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. §1229b(b)(1)(D). Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson was arrested and detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement for remaining in the United States beyond the expiration of his touris

O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier In 2014, Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T. J. Zane created public Facebook pages to promote their campaigns for election to the Poway Unified School District (PUSD) Board of Trustees. While O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane (whom we will call the Trustees) both had personal Facebook pages that they shared with friends and family, they used their public pages for campaigning and issues related to PUSD. After they won election, the Trustees continued to use their public pages to post PUSD-related content, including board-meeting recaps, application solicitations for board positions, local budget plans and surveys, and public safety updates. They also used their pages to solicit feedback and communicate with constituents. Their Facebook pages described them as “Government Official[s]” and noted their official positions. O’Connor-Ratcliff also created a public Twitter page, which she used in much the same way. Christopher and Kimberly Garnier, who have children attending PUSD schools, o

 James Freed, like countless other Americans, created a private Facebook profile sometime before 2008. He eventually converted his profile to a public “page,” meaning that anyone could see and comment on his posts. In 2014, Freed updated his Facebook page to reflect that he was appointed city manager of Port Huron, Michigan, describing himself as “Daddy to Lucy, Husband to Jessie and City Manager, Chief Administrative Officer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.” Freed continued to operate his Facebook page himself and continued to post prolifically (and primarily) about his personal life. Freed also posted information related to his job, such as highlighting communications from other city officials and soliciting feedback from the public on issues of concern. Freed often responded to comments on his posts, including those left by city residents with inquiries about community matters. He occasionally deleted comments that he considered “derogatory” or “stupid.” After the COVID–19 pandemic began, Freed posted a

PULSIFER v. UNITED STATES No. 22–340. Argued October 2, 2023—Decided March 15, 2024 After pleading guilty to distributing at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, petitioner Mark Pulsifer faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. At sentencing, he sought to take advantage of the “safety valve” provision of federal sentencing law, which allows a sentencing court to disregard the statutory minimum if a defendant meets five criteria. Among those is the requirement, set out in Paragraph (f)(1), that the sentencing court find that— (1) the defendant does not have— (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines. The Government argued that Pulsifer could not satisfy that requirement because he had two prior three-point offenses tota

Trump v. Anderson A group of Colorado voters contends that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former President Donald J. Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomination of the Republican Party in this year’s election, from becoming President again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with that contention. It ordered the Colorado secretary of state to exclude the former President from the Republican primary ballot in the State and to disregard any write-in votes that Colorado voters might cast for him. Former President Trump challenges that decision on several grounds. Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, we reverse. Read by Jake Leahy. 

Trump v. AndersonJUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. "“If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamental principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized “to say what the law is” only because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases . . . must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).  Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, deciding not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colorado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment

Trump v. AndersonDONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO [March 4, 2024] JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I and II–B of the Court’s opinion. I agree that States lack the power to enforce Section 3 against Presidential candidates. That principle is sufficient to resolve this case, and I would decide no more than that. This suit was brought by Colorado voters under state law in state court. It does not require us to address the complicated question whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle through which Section 3 can be enforced. The majority’s choice of a different path leaves the remaining Justices with a choice of how to respond. In my judgment, this is not the time to amplify disagreement with stridency. The Court has settled a politically charged issue in the volatile season of a Presidential election. Particularly in this circumstance, writings on the Court should turn the nation