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Obituary of Author Ken Arrow 1. Arrovian impossibility theorem 2. “…. the celebrated general possibility theorem, or the Arrovian impossibility theorem in the currently prevailing terminology, to the effect that there exists no social welfare function satisfying a set of conditions necessary for democratic legitimacy and informational efficiency.” Source: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A.K., Suzumura, K. (Eds). (2002) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1. Elsevier. (p.11). “According to his celebrated general impossibility theorem, a set of seemingly reasonable axioms that are meant to crystallize minimal requirements on the “democratic” rule for resolving the conflicting claims of individuals is demonstrably self-contradictory, so that there cannot possibly exist a satisfactory rule.” 3. Source: Suzumura, K. (2009) Rational choice, collective decision, and social welfare. Cambridge University Press. (p.62). “Pareto principle, … a change from one social state to another social state